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ABSTRACT  
For any multicast group communication, group key agreement 
was found to be challenging because of its dynamic nature. 
Group key management scheme are of either distributed, 
centralized or hybrid architecture. Although many solutions 
have been proposed to handle group key changes, this paper 
gives the aspects of rekeying performed by those schemes. In 
the entire existing scheme the primary security mechanism of 
group communication is achieved by conventional encryption 
algorithms, in which key distribution and rekeying of the group 
key was done by Group controller. This paper explores the 
various algorithms along with the performances and derives an 
improved method. In this paper we propose a distributed key 
distribution scheme, using a logical group key structure, PFMH 
tree, and the concept of virtual user position. This approach 
ensures the forward secrecy and backward secrecy, reduces the 
rekeying complexity, communication, computation and storage 
complexity and time cost. 
Keywords  
Multicast, tree-based key distribution, multicast key distribution 
schemes, logical group key structure, rekeying, erasure 
decoding. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Multicast is the delivery of a message or information to a group 
of destination computers simultaneously in a single 
transmission. Such applications need a secure group key to 
communicate their data. This brings importance to key 
distribution techniques. For group-oriented applications, 
multicast is an essential mechanism to achieve scalable 
information distribution. Multicast describes communication 
where information is sent from one or more parties to a set of 
other parties. In this case, information is distributed from one or 
more senders to a set of receivers, but not to all users of the 
group. The advantage of multicast is that, it enables the desired 
applications to service many users without overloading a 
network and resources in the server. 
Security is essential for data transmission through an insecure 
network. There are several schemes to address the unicast 
security issues but they cannot be directly extended to a 
multicast environment. In general, multicasting is far more 
vulnerable [1], [2], [3] than unicast because the transmission 
takes place over multiple network channels. In multicast group 
communication, all the authorized members share a session key, 
which will be changed dynamically to ensure forward and 
backward secrecy referred as "group rekeying". 
 
The forward secrecy ensures that the members who left the 
group cannot get access to future group data, and the backward 
secrecy ensures that currently joined members cannot access 
past group data. For a multicast group with a large number of 
members, key-tree based schemes were introduced to 
decompose a large group into multiple subgroups with smaller 
sizes [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. Using these schemes, communication 
complexity is reduced at the cost of increase in storage and 
computation complexity, very few efforts have been made to 
reduce computation complexity, Communication complexity, 
storage complexity, Time cost and Scalability. 
There are three types of group key management schemes. In 
centralized key management, such as, group members trust a 
centralized server, referred to as the key distribution center 
(KDC), which generates and distributes encryption keys. In 
decentralized schemes, the task of KDC is divided among 
subgroup managers. In contributory key management schemes, 
group members are trusted equally and all participate in key 
establishment. In any key distribution schemes, a basic operation 
is needed to distribute a piece of secret data to a small group of 
members, where each member shares a different individual key 
with the GC. In all current existing schemes, this operation is 
fulfilled by the GC using conventional encryptions followed by 
unicasts. A new scheme  called efficient computation multicast 
key distribution [1] realizes this operation using one erasure 
decoding of certain MDS code, followed by one multicast to all 
the members and centralized in nature which uses MDS code-
Based Rekeying on the key tree. This key tree based rekeying 
does not change communication complexity and storage 
complexity [9].  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents 
comparison of group key management protocols, Section 3 will 
discuss the related works, Section 4 deals with our contribution, 
and Section  5  evaluates the results and discusses impacts of 
rekeying. Section 6  concludes the paper and explores further 
work. 
2. COMPARISON OF GROUP KEY 
MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS 
2.1 Centralized key management protocols: A single entity is 
employed for controlling the whole group; hence a group key 
management protocol seeks to minimize   storage requirements, 
computational power on both client and server sides, and 
bandwidth utilization. Although the centralized approach has a 
problem of a single point of failure, some applications like stock 
quotes are still centralized. To overcome this problem, a mirror 
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and/or load sharing [11]. Some examples of centralized group 
key protocols are: Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) [12], One-Way 
Function Trees (OFT) [13] and Key Management using Boolean 
Function Minimization (KM-BFM) technique [14]. In LKH 
protocols, the key server stores (2m + 1) symmetric keys and 
each member stores (log2m+ 1) symmetric keys. OFT proposed 
a variation of LKH by employing a functional relationship 
among the node keys in a binary key tree along the path from 
the leaf node representing the leaving member to the root. OFC 
reduces the communication overhead from LKH’s 2 log2 N − 1 
to log2 N by introducing a public pseudo-random function G 
which doubles the size of its input [21]. In KM-BFM protocol, 
the key server stores 2(log2 m+1) keys and each member stores 
(log2m + 1) keys. The centralized approaches are generally 
based on the idea of LKH where a key distribution center 
maintains a key tree. Each member knows all the symmetric 
keys from its leaf to the root. 
2.2  Decentralized key management protocols:  The 
management of a large group is divided among subgroup 
managers, trying to minimize the problem of concentrating the 
work in a single manager. These protocols need more trusted 
nodes and suffer from encryptions and decryptions processes 
between subgroup managers. Some examples of decentralized 
protocols are: Scalable Multicast Key Distribution using Core 
Based Tree (CBT) [15], Iolus [16], Dual-Encryption Protocol 
(DEP) [17] and Kronos [18]. Cheng and Laih [26] modified 
Tseng’s conference key agreement protocol based on bilinear 
pairing. In 2009, Huang et al. [27] proposed a non-interactive 
protocol based on DL assumption to improve the efficiency of 
Tseng’s protocol. 
2.3  Distributed key management protocols:  There is no 
explicit manager, and the members themselves do the key 
generation. All members can perform access control and  the 
generation of the key can be rather contributory, meaning that 
all members contribute some information to generate the group 
key, or done by one of the members. The distributed protocols 
have a scalability problem in case of key update, since they 
require performing large computations and they are 
characterized by large communication overheads. Further, they 
need all group members to have powerful resources. Some 
examples of distributed key management protocols are: Octopus 
Protocol [2],   Distributed Logical Key Hierarchy [15] and 
Diffie-Hellman Logical Key Hierarchy [8]. In the following 
subsection, an overview of the proposed protocol is given.  
For secure multicast services, various tree based group key 
management schemes have been introduced until now. 
Traditional tree based approaches uses conventional encryption 
algorithms which focus on reducing the number of    rekeying 
messages transmitted by the key distribution center (group 
manager/controller). However, they do not consider the network 
bandwidth used for transmitting each rekeying message. To 
provide a scalable rekeying, the key tree approach makes use of 
KEKs so that the rekeying cost increases logarithmically with 
the group size for a join or depart request. 
 An individual key serves the same function as KEK, except that 
it is shared only by the GC and an individual member [21]. To 
this end, KDC aggregates multiple rekeying messages into one 
multicast flow, which is referred to as group oriented rekeying 
[7]. In group oriented rekeying, all rekeying messages are 
delivered to all group members. This causes the bandwidth 
waste because rekeying messages are delivered to members who 
do not need them as well as intended receivers. 
3. RELATED WORKS 
Several good explorations have been done for dealing with the 
group key distribution in a large group with frequent 
membership changes. There are two types of key establishment 
protocols: key transfer protocols and key agreement protocols. 
Key transfer protocols rely on a mutually trusted key generation 
center (KGC) to select session keys and then transport session 
keys to all communication entities secretly. Most often, KGC 
encrypts session keys under another secret key shared with each 
entity during registration.  
In key agreement protocols, all communication entities are 
involved to determine session keys. The common key agreement 
protocol used in  most distributed group key management 
protocols  is Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement protocol. 
Some of the examples are: Bresson et al. [25] constructed a 
generic authenticated group DH Key exchange and the 
algorithm is provably secure. Katz and Yung [28] proposed the 
first constant-round and fully scalable group DH protocol which 
is provably secure in the standard model. The main feature of 
the group DH key exchange is to establish a secret group key 
among all group members without relying on a mutually trusted 
KGC. 
A.  Novel approach for Multicast Rekeying 
This system proposes a hybrid scheme which makes the 
computation complexity much more efficient with significant 
rekeying cost. In this paper [9]  a set of dummy user are 
introduced by the server who join or leaves the group. The group 
key is initially distributed by the group controller using the MDS 
code, whenever a user joins or leaves the group, then the new 
group key is calculated by the group member. For security 
reason, the rekeying using MDS codes has been done in some 
interval. Hence it reduces the rekeying cost.  
Performance of this scheme includes computation complexity 
and communication complexity. Since rekeying is not done 
regularly whenever a member leaves, computation complexity is 
reduced. A value is set to indicate the rekeying process which 
reduces the communication cost. 
B.  Computation-efficient multicast key 
Distribution 
The basic scheme of this paper is dynamic key distribution using 
Maximum Distance Separable codes (MDS), a class of error 
control codes. For a dynamic multicast group, a group controller 
issues a session key to establish a secure multicast channel with 
authorized group member [10].  This employs a centralized 
group key management scheme. Whenever group members join 
or leave, the GC reissues a new session key, which is 
independent of the entire  old session key. This rekeying 
procedure ensures the forward and backward secrecy. This 
scheme concentrates on the rekeying operation when an old 
member leaves since current session key cannot be used to 
convey the new session key information securely, as it is known 
to the old member. The basic operation for any key distribution 
scheme is to distribute secret data to a small group of n 
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decoding of certain MDS code, followed by one multicast to all 
the n members. 
In this approach, the rekeying is done at every member join or 
leave. The new group key is multicasted to the group members 
each time by the group controller through multicasting to 
establish security. In this scheme, the GC has to communicate 
with the group members each time. The complexity of the 
rekeying operation changes because rekeying is done at every 
member joins or leaves the group, which results in high 
computational complexity.  
In this scheme , when a member leaves the group, rekeying 
operation is performed to compute the new group key, which 
increases the burden on the server to recompute the group key 
and then multicast to all the members of the group. Since it is 
dynamic in nature, several rekeying operation is taking place. 
C.  A New Secure Multicast Key Distribution 
Protocol Using Combinatorial Boolean 
Approach 
The proposed protocol in this scheme is based on Key 
Management using Boolean Function Minimization (KM-BFM) 
technique  [11]. KM-BFM protocol is considered an 
enhancement to LKH protocols. Instead of using one tree as in 
KM-BFM; the members are divided into a number of subgroup 
trees. The group manager holds n key pairs and each group 
member holds y keys. The proposed protocol achieves a lower 
storage at both the group manager and the group members 
compared to KM-BFM protocol. It has to be noted that the 
authentication problem is not addressed in the present paper.  
This  protocol achieves a lower storage at both the group 
manager and the group members compared to KM-BFM 
protocol. Also, it has a lower update message length in case of a 
single member leave and a comparable update message length in 
case of multiple leaves. Furthermore, the probability of 
conducting a successful collusion attack in the proposed 
protocol is less than that proposed in KM-BFM protocol. 
D.  A new probabilistic rekeying method for 
secure multicast groups  
The Probabilistic optimization of LKH (PLKH) scheme [19], 
optimized rekey cost by organizing LKH tree with user rekey 
characteristic. This paper concentrate on further reducing the 
rekey cost by organizing LKH tree with respect to compromise 
probabilities of members using new join and leave operations.   
The key identifier assignment requires more memory to store 
key identifiers. Though total nodes created are less than PLKH 
& LKH schemes, this scheme treats some nodes harshly in terms 
of depth assigned. Finally, this scheme only ensures that tree 
structure is binary. It neither tries to maintain strict binary tree as 
PLKH nor tries to balance all nodes at same level as LKH. 
E.  Bandwidth Efficient Key Distribution for 
Secure Multicast in Dynamic Wireless Mesh 
Networks  
This scheme proposes a bandwidth efficient key tree 
management scheme [20] for dynamic wireless mesh networks 
where membership hangs occur frequently. They use ABR 
(adaptive and bandwidth reducing) tree, a bandwidth efficient 
key tree management approach for wireless mesh networks 
when the group membership is dynamically changed. When a 
new member joins the group, this scheme assigns to the new 
member the proper KEKs (key encryption keys) to keep the 
expected bandwidth consumption of the  key tree as low as 
possible. This scheme delivers rekeying messages only to group 
members who are related to the rekeying message in order to 
reduce bandwidth waste. ABR tree is used to effectively reduce 
the actual bandwidth consumption used for rekeying compared 
to traditional key tree management schemes. 
This scheme relies more computation time on key distribution 
centre. If relaying nodes in wireless mesh networks deliver 
rekeying messages only to group members who are related to the 
rekeying message, bandwidth waste can be decreased but 
communication and computation complexity is increased.   
 
F.  Optimal Communication Complexity of 
Generic Multicast Key Distribution 
This scheme deals with tight lower bound on the communication 
complexity of secure multicast key distribution protocols in 
which rekey messages are built using symmetric-key encryption, 
pseudorandom generators and secret sharing schemes [22]. 
Updating the group key for each group membership change is at 
least log2(n)  −  O(1) basic rekey messages. Key distribution in 
multicast is implemented using a central distribution authority, 
called the group center, responsible for establishing a shared key 
among all privileged group members, and for “rekeying” the 
group every time a new member joins and/or an existing 
member leaves the group. This lower bound involves defining a 
sequence of adversarial-chosen REPLACE operations 
(simultaneous execution of a LEAVE and JOIN) and every 
protocol incurs an average communication cost of log2 n for 
such a sequence and  every individual LEAVE performed for a 
cost of log2(n) multicast messages and every individual JOIN 
for log2(n) unicast messages. 
G. Authenticated Group Key Transfer Protocol 
Based on Secret Sharing  
In this paper, [22] an authenticated key transfer protocol based 
on secret sharing scheme that KGC can broadcast group key 
information to all group members at once and only authorized 
group members can recover the group key; but unauthorized 
users cannot recover the group key. It also provide 
authentication for transporting group key. In this approach, the 
confidentiality of group key is ensured using any encryption 
algorithm which is computationally secure. This protocol uses 
secret sharing scheme to replace the encryption algorithm. A 
broadcast message is sent to all group members at once. This 
scheme only focus on protecting group key information 
broadcasted from KGC to all group members. 
H.  Optimizing the Rekeying Cost for 
Contributory Group Key Agreement Schemes 
This paper, proposes a contributory group key agreement that 
achieves the performance lower bound by utilizing a novel 
logical key tree structure, called PFMH, and the concept of 
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O(1) rounds of the two-party Diffie-Hellman (DH) upon any 
single-user join event and O(log n) rounds of the two-party DH 
upon any single-user leave event. The proposed scheme 
achieves a lower rekeying cost than the existing tree-based 
contributory group key agreement schemes. 
4. OUR CONTRIBUTION 
Although a contributory group key agreement is a promising 
solution to achieve access control in collaborative and dynamic 
group applications, the existing schemes have not achieved the 
performance lower bound in terms of time, communication, and 
computation costs.  In tree-based contributory group key 
agreement schemes, keys are organized in a logical tree 
structure, referred to as the key tree. In a key tree, the root node 
represents the group key, leaf nodes represent the members’ 
private keys, and each intermediate node corresponds to a 
subgroup key shared by all the members (leaf nodes) under this 
node. The key of each non-leaf node is generated by performing 
the two-party DH between the two subgroups represented by its 
two children where each child represents the subgroup including 
all the members (leaf nodes) under this node [29]. 
In this paper we propose a distributed key distribution scheme, 
using a logical group key structure, PFMH tree, and the concept 
of virtual user position. The proposed scheme applied upon any 
single user join or leave and multi user joins or leave event. This 
approach ensures the forward secrecy and backward secrecy, 
reduces the rekeying complexity, communication, computation 
and storage complexity and time cost. In this paper, session keys 
information is encoded using error control codes rather than 
encryptions. We propose an efficient logical key tree structure, 
called PFMH tree with MDS code to optimize the rekeying. 
4.1. Rekeying using MDS code on PFMH tree 
The PFMH tree follows a PACK protocol, in which each group 
member equally contributes its share to the group key, and this 
share is never relieved to the others. PACK includes a set of 
rekeying protocols to update the group key upon group 
membership change events for security purpose. The PACK 
protocol can achieve the minimum rekeying time cost upon 
membership change events. For any single-user Join event, the 
rekeying cost is O(1), and for any single user leave event, the 
rekeying time cost is of O(log n). The communication and 
computation costs can still be reduced by adopting PFMH tree 
and by introducing phantom nodes in the key tree. 
In this scheme, each member will maintain and update the 
global key tree locally. Each group member knows all the 
subgroup keys on its key path and knows the ID and the exact 
location of any other current group member in the key tree. In 
PACK, when a new user joins the group, it will always be 
attached to the root of the join tree to achieve O(1) rekeying cost 
in terms of computation per user, time, and communication. 
When a user leaves the current group, according to the leaving 
member's location in the key tree, as well as whether this 
member has a phantom location in the key tree, different 
procedures will be applied, and the basic idea is to update the 
group key in O(log n) rounds and simultaneously reduce the 
communication and computation costs. 
4.1.1 Rekeying on Single-User Join  
When a new user M wants to join the group G, the PACK 
initiates the single-user join protocol by broadcasting a request 
message that contains its member ID, a join request, its own 
blinded key, some necessary authentication information, and its 
signature for this request message. After receiving this user join 
 
Fig.1 An examples of key tree update upon single-user join 
event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
request message the current group members will check and a new 
group key will be generated in order to incorporate a secret share 
from M. The rekeying upon single-user joins needs to perform two 
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update upon single-user join events.  
In the first example tree consists of four members. After the new 
member M5 joins the group, a new node is created to act as the 
new root, and the node (b1) becomes the new join tree that 
represents M5. In the second example, when M6 joins the group, 
at the first round, the MDS is first performed between M5 and 
M6 to generate a new join tree, at the second round, the MDS is 
performed between the new join tree and the main tree to 
generate a new group key. 
4.1.2 Rekeying on Single-User Leave 
When a current group member Y wants to leave the group, it 
broadcasts a leave request message to initiate the single user 
leave protocol, which contains its ID, a leave request, and a 
signature for this message. In order to reduce the rekeying cost 
upon a single-user leave event, PACK creates a phantom node 
that allows an existing member to simultaneously occupy more 
than one leaf node in the key tree. Fig 2 depicts the model of 
user leave and in this example, user M6 leaves the group where 
node (b0) is the root of the main tree and node (b1) is the root of 
the join tree. Since the size of the join tree is 2, the node 
representing M6 will be directly removed  from the key tree, M5 
changes its secret share, and a new group key will be generated 
by applying the MDS between M5 and the subgroup in the main 
tree. 
4.1.3  Rekeying on Multi-user Join and Leave 
protocol 
PACK also has group merge and group partition protocols to 
handle simultaneously the join and leave of multiple users. 
Although multiple user events can be implemented by applying 
a sequence of single-user join or leave protocols, such sequential 
implementations are usually not cost-efficient. The group 
merges protocol, combines  two or more groups into a single 
group, and returns a PF key tree. Group partition protocol, 
removes multiple group members simultaneously from the 
current group and construct a new PF key tree for the rest of the 
group members. In the group merge protocols, after removing 
all phantom nodes from those key trees corresponding to 
different subgroups, each key tree is split into several full key 
trees.   The final result is obtained by uniting these full key trees 
into a PF tree using unite procedure. Similar to the group 
partition protocol, after removing all phantom nodes and leaving 
nodes, the original key tree is split into several full key trees, 
and the unite procedure is then applied on these full key trees to 
create a PF key tree.  Since the height of the returned tree is log 
n, where n is the group size after merging/partitioning, the time 
cost of group merge/partition is bounded by O(log n). 
5. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
The experiments are carried out on an Intel Core 2Duo 2.80-
GHz machine with a 2-Gbyte memory running windows XP. 
The implementation results of computations and 
communications are presented in Fig.3 and 4. From these 
results; we can see that   
  
 
Fig.2 An example of key tree update upon single-user leave event 
 
upon a single-user join event, PFMH has the lowest cost among all 
the schemes. Compared with GC, PFMH has more than 10 percent 
reduction in computation cost and a more than 65 percent reduction 
in communication cost and time cost. Compared with GC, the 
reduction is even more, about 50 percent in computation cost and 
about 80 percent in time and communication costs. Upon a single-
user leave event, compared with GC, PFMH has about a 25 percent 
reduction in computation cost, about a 15 percent reduction in time 
cost, and a similar communication cost.  
Although PFMH has slightly higher computation and communication 
costs than GC upon a single user leave event, when averaged over 
both join and leave events, the reduction is still significant, with a 20 
percent reduction in computation cost, 35 percent reduction in 
communication cost, and 40 percent reduction in time cost. Fig 5 and 
6, shows the key distribution time and key recovery time of both the 
scheme under various multicast group sizes. It is clear that using one-
way hash functions adds none-trivial computation complexity. 
Nevertheless, the proposed scheme still out performs the GC schemes 
by a significant margin. The computation time of the key distribution 
is also compared to GC for a selected multicast group size. Notice 
that the computation times of both the GC is significantly larger than 
proposed schemes.  
6. CONCLUSION 
Key transfer protocols rely on a mutually trusted key generation 
center (KGC) to select session keys and transport   session keys to all 
communication entities secretly. Most often, KGC encrypts session 
keys under another secret key shared with each entity during 
registration. We have optimized dynamic multicast key distribution 
scheme with MDS codes using PFMH tree. The computation 
complexity of key distribution is greatly reduced by employing 
erasure decoding of MDS codes instead of more expensive 
encryption and decryption computations. The    MDS codes was 
combined with PFMH trees and performance of distribution time and 
key recovery time was evaluated, this scheme provides much lower 
computation complexity while maintaining low and balanced 
communication complexity and storage complexity for dynamic 
group key distribution. This scheme is thus practical for many 
applications in various broadcast capable networks such as Internet 
and wireless networks. 
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COMPARISON OF KEY RECOVERY TIME 
 
 
 
   
Fig. 3 Computation cost 
 
 
 
  Fig. 4 Communication cost 
 
 
 
  Fig.5 key distribution time 
 
 
 
 
  Fig.6 key recovery time 
 
7. REFERENCES 
[1]   Peter S. Kruus and Joseph P. Macker, “Techniques and issues in 
multicast security," 
MILCOM98,1998. 
[2]   Paul Judge and Mostafa Ammar, "Security Issues and Solutions 
in Multicast Content Distribution: A Survey", IEEE  Network, 
February 2003, pp 30-36. 
[3]   M. Moyer, J. Rao and P. Rohatgi, "A Survey of   Security Issues 
in Multicast Communications",    IEEE Network Magazine, Vol. 13, 
No.6, March  1999, pp. 12-23. 
[4]   M. Waldvogel, G. Caronni, D. Sun, N. Weiler and B. Plattner, 
"The VersaKey Framework: Versatile Group Key   Management", 
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 7(8), 1614-
1631, August 1999. 
[5]   S. Mittra, “Iolus:  A Framework for Scalable  Secure 
Multicasting", Proc. of ACM  SIGCOMMi'97, 277-288, Sep. 1997. 
[6]   D. M. Wallner, E. J. Harder and R. C. Agee, "Key Management  
for  Multicast:  Issues  and  Architectures", Internet Draft (work in 
progress), draft-wallner-key-arch-01.txt, Sep. 15, 1998. 
[7]    C. K. Wong, M. Gouda and S. S. Lam, "Secure Group 
Communications Using Key Graphs", Proc.ACM  SIGCOMM'98, 
Sep. 1998. 
[8]    Y. Kim, A. Perrig, and G. Tsudik, "Tree-Based Group Key 
Agreement," ACM Trans. Information and System Security, vol. 7, 
no. 1, pp. 60-96, Feb. 
[9]    S. Benson Edwin Raj, J. Jeffneil Lalith , "A Novel Approach for 
Computation-Efficient Rekeying for Multicast Key  Distribution" 
IJCSNS , VOL.9 No.3, March 2009. 
[10]  Lihao Xu, Cheng Huang, "Computation   Efficient Multicast 
Key Distribution," IEEE     Trans. Parallel And Distributed Systems, 
Vol 19,  No. 5, May 2008. 
[11]   Mohamed M. Nasreldin Rasslan,  Yasser H.   Dakroury, and 
Heba K. Aslan “A  New Secure     Multicast Key  Distribution 
Protocol Using Combinatorial Boolean Approach”   ,International 
Journal of Network Security, Vol.8, No.1, PP.75–89, Jan. 2009 
S.Sasikala Devi,Dr.Antony Selvadoss Danamani, Int. J. Comp. Tech. Appl., Vol 2 (3), 385-391
390
ISSN:2229-6093[12]   C.Wong, M. Gouda, and S. Lam, “secure group 
Communications using  key graphs,”    Proceedings of ACM 
SIGCOMM, pp. 68-79,  Vancouver, British Columbia, 
September  1998. 
[13]    D. McGrew, and A. Sherman, Key Establishment in 
Large Dynamic Groups Using  One-Way Function  Trees, 
Technical Report   No. 0755, TIS Labs at Network Associates, 
Inc.,  Glenwood, MD, May 1998. 
[14]    I. Chang, R. Engel, D. Kandlur, D. Pendarakis,  and D. 
Saha,“Key management for secure   internet  multicast using 
Boolean function  minimization techniques,” Proceedings of the 
IEEE INFOCOM, vol. 2, pp. 689-698, New York, Mar. 1999. 
[15]    A. Ballardie, Scalable Multicast Key Distribution, RFC 
1949, 1996. 
[16]    S. Mittra, “Iolus: A framework for scalable secure 
multicasting,” Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM, vol. 27, no. 
4, pp. 277-288, New York, Sep. 1997. 
[17]    L. Dondeti, S.Mukherjee and A. Samal, “Scalable secure 
one-to-many  group  communication  using  dual               
encryption,” IComputer and Communication, vol. 23, no. 17, pp. 
1681-1701, Nov. 1999. 
[18]    S. Setia, S. Zhu, and S. Jajodia,“Kronos: A scalable group 
re-keying approach for secure multicast,”  Proceeding of the 
IEEE Symposium on Security and Praivcy, pp. 215-228, 
Oakland, California, May 2000. 
[19]    A new probabilistic rekeying method for secure multicast 
groups Shankar Joshi, Alwyn R. Pais, 
[20]    Bandwidth Efficient Key Distribution for Secure 
Multicast in Dynamic Wireless Mesh Networks, Seungjae Shin, 
Junbeom Hur, Hanjin Lee, Hyunsoo Yoon WCNC 2009 
proceedings. 
[21]   Joe Prathap P M. , V.Vasudevan,”Analysis of the various 
key  management algorithms and new proposal in  the secure 
multicast communications”, (IJCSIS) International Journal of 
Computer Science and Information Security, Vol. 2, No.1, 2009 
[22]   Daniele Micciancio and Saurabh Panjwani, “Optimal 
Communication Complexity of Generic Multicast Key 
Distribution”, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (2008). 
[24]  Lein Harn and Changlu Lin , “Authenticated Group Key 
Transfer Protocol Based on Secret Sharing”, IEEE transactions 
on computers, vol. 59, no. 6, June 2010 
[25] E. Bresson, O. Chevassut, and D. Pointcheval, “Provably-
Secure Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman Key  Exchange,” 
ACM Trans. Information and System Security, vol. 10, no. 3, 
pp. 255-264, Aug. 2007. 
[26]    J.C. Cheng and C.S. Laih, “Conference Key Agreement 
Protocol with Non-Interactive Fault-Tolerance Over Broadcast 
Network,” Int’l J. Information Security, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 37-48, 
2009. 
[27]    K.H. Huang, Y.F. Chung, H.H. Lee, F. Lai, and T.S. 
Chen, “A Conference Key Agreement Protocol with  Fault-
Tolerant Capability,” Computer Standards and Interfaces, vol. 
31, pp. 401-405, Jan. 2009. 
[28]    J. Katz and M. Yung, “Scalable Protocols for Authenticated 
Group Key Exchange,” J. Cryptology, vol. 20, pp. 85-113, 2007.   
[29]    Wei Yu, Yan (Lindsay) Sun, Member,  IEEE, and K.J. Ray 
Liu, Fellow, IEEE, “Optimizing the Rekeying Cost  for Contributory  
Group Key Agreement Schemes”, IEEE transactions  on dependable 
and secure computing,  vol. 4, no. 3, July-September 2007. 
 
S.Sasikala Devi,Dr.Antony Selvadoss Danamani, Int. J. Comp. Tech. Appl., Vol 2 (3), 385-391
391
ISSN:2229-6093